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DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN SPACE-AN
INTERNATIONAL DILEMMA*
Arvid Pardo**
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF OCEAN SPACE
Science and technology are giving us power previously at-
tributed to God alone. Advances in medical science, biology, and
physics suggest that in a not too remote future it may be possible
greatly to prolong useful human life and to create new forms
of life; perhaps even a new man.' Nuclear energy, advances in
engineering and a wide range of scientific fields, some totally
new, are producing a new civilization. The dimensions of our
world are exploding: on the one hand we are reaching to the
planets, on the other to the mysterious depths of the oceans. We
have, or soon will have, the knowledge and the power to realize
the age-old dream of the prophets: the Kingdom of God on Earth.
Man can, however, use his unprecedented new power, wit-
tingly or unwittingly, to destroy both himself and the very earth
on which he lives. Nuclear energy, as we all know, can be used
to destroy civilization. The recent discovery of anti-matter may
within a generation give us the awesome power to destroy our
planet. The infant science of genetic engineering could well place
in the hands of government the power of creating a race forever
destined to slavery. Our intrusion into the ocean depths in
search of knowledge, wealth, or strategic advantage will enable
us to appropriate, exploit, and also irreparably to contaminate
an environment increasingly essential to all. Thus the present
decade will probably mark the most momentous crisis ever
experienced by mankind in its million year history: at stake
is the survival of man.
It is increasingly accepted that the use of technology should
be regulated by the state in the public interest. The vital chal-
lenge which we face is to extend this concept. We must convince
states, in the interest of all, voluntarily to accept some limita-
* The following article is an adaptation of a two-part speech delivered
at the annual Bailey Lectures in April, 1970, at the Louisiana State Univer-
sity School of Law.
** Chairman, Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations; Ambas-
sador from Malta to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada.
1. See G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB pW84m (1968).
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tion on the manner in which they may use their technological
capabilities. If we succeed in making progress in expanding
international law to cover this new field, we may nourish the
hope that our scientific knowledge and technological power will
be used constructively and with increasing wisdom; if it becomes
apparent that states will not accept necessary limitations to
their traditional rights, there can be no doubt that international
rivalries will compel the use of our unprecented technological
capabilites for short term advantage without regard to long
term consequences and the future will be dark indeed.
I would emphasize that scientific and technological advance is
accelerating; we have little time to construct new international
law to meet the vital needs of all states in the new world which
is emerging. It is against this general background that we should
view the contemporary 'debate on the oceans.
We all know that the seas cover more than two-thirds of
our planet: the continents are but large islands in a global ocean.
The ocean was the cradle of life; from the dark oceans the
progenitors of man emerged. We still bear in our bodies-in
our blood, in the salty bitterness of our tears-the marks of this
remote past. But the ocean is more than man's past; it is his
future. In the seas and oceans can be found unique opportunities
for recreation for our urban populations, water for town and
country, sources of new drugs; energy, food, and minerals in
virtually inexhaustible profusion. Already scientists are living
on the ocean floor for months at a time, perhaps soon the seabed
will become part of our living space.
Increasingly, our civilization must turn to the seas, or rather
return to the seas, to the seabed and to its sub-soil-to ocean
space as a whole-for its continued existence. And this last
great frontier on earth is becoming accessible to us at a critical
point in time when increasing populations, spreading industriali-
zation, and ever more urgent demands for improved standards
of living are subjecting land-based resources to pressures they
may not long be able to economically sustain.
In the past, for thousands of years, only the surface and
upper layers of the ocean were used and exploited, mainly for
navigation, in peace and war, and for fishing. Only late in the
19th century did man probe deeper with the first scientific ex-
peditions, with the laying of the first transatlantic cables, and
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with the construction of the first primitive submersibles. In the
first half of this century, methods of exploration, use, and ex-
ploitation were improved and diversified. Minerals began to be
extracted from sea-water; petroleum and sulphur began to be
mined from under the ocean floor.2
During the past twenty years the pace of technology has
greatly accelerated. Improved scientific methods and a host of
new devices from underwater photography and television to
deep submergence vehicles have enabled us to gather more
knowledge about the deep seas and the seabed during this period
than in all previous history. Technology is also permitting ex-
ploitation of living and mineral resources at ever greater, al-
though still comparatively modest, depths. Thus, for instance,
prototype subsea systems for deep water drilling and petroleum
production capable of operating at depths exceeding 1,000 feet
will probably be in operation this year. This is almost double
the depth that had been thought economically feasible only a
very few years ago. At the same time, deep saturation diving
techniques enable man to live and work in depths up to 600
feet, and it is expected that this capability will extend to over
1500 feet in the near future.
The potential benefits, both to individuals and to the world
community, that can be derived from the exploration, use, and
exploitation of ocean space are obvious; the dangers are less so.
The latter derive not so much from bad intentions on the part
of individuals or states as from the pressures of international
economic, political, and military competition and from inertia,
due to rooted habits of thought, in the face of massive intensifi-
cation and diversification in the use and exploitation of all di-
mensions of an environment where traditionally laissez faire
has been the rule.
One hundred, even fifty years ago, recreational use of coastal
waters was rare; now beaches near coastal cities are crowded;
recreational sailing is popular and skindivers and recreational
submersibles are penetrating the deeper strata of the seas.8
Ships are becoming bigger; not long ago a supertanker carried
35,000 deadweight tons. Now a fleet of ships each with nearly
2. See generally Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineer-
ing and Resources, Our Nation and the Sea-A Plan for National Action,
H.R. Doc. No. 91-42, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 4 (1969).
3. See generally 4d. at ch. 3.
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ten times that capacity is coming into being. An accident now
could have far more serious consequences for the marine en-
vironment than a few years ago.
Fixed navigational aids in the seas, apart from lighthouses,
were rare outside the immediate approaches to ports; now the
seabed is crisscrossed by cables and increasingly by pipelines,
and a variety of weather and navigational buoys dot the oceans.
Structures erected on the seabed were virtually unknown before
the beginning of this century and were rare until twenty years
ago. Now a forest of oil derricks covers some areas near the
coast. Underwater oil storage tanks, scarcely conceivable even
five years ago, are being built; underwater habitats are begin-
ning to be erected.
Until recently, military uses of ocean space were limited
to the surface and to the upper layers of the waters. Now a
variety of deep submergence vehicles penetrate thousands of
feet, sonar systems detect and track vessels moving on and under
the surface of the oceans, and deployment of nuclear missile
systems on the ocean floor is being discussed.
Finally, man, until recently, could safely utilize the sea as
a receptacle for sewage and other effluents, confident that the
wastes would be rapidly diluted, dispersed, and degraded. This
now is becoming increasingly hazardous, for, as Wenk observes,
"With the growth of population and the concentration of coastal
industry... [t]he sheer bulk of the material to be disposed of
and the presence of new types of non-degradable waste products
are a special threat to coastal waters .... ,,4 The dumping of radio-
active wastes, intensified offshore exploitation of mineral re-
sources, particularly petroleum; the runoff of chemicals and in-
secticides, such as D.D.T.; the effect of increasing air pollution-
for instance, lead from the internal combustion engine is carried
into the atmosphere and has a fallout rate into the sea of some
100,000 tons per year-all these are subjecting the ecology of the
coastal margin of industrial countries to unendurable strains. Pol-
lutants are beginning to appear with increasing frequency in the
open ocean. Efforts, of course, are being made to mitigate the
pollution of coastal water. The major thrust, however, is not so
much to reduce the sources of pollution globally but for each
4. Wenk, The Physical Resource8 of the Ocean, ScIENTFC AmEmCAN 167,
168 (Sept. 1969).
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state to dispose of wastes in a way that will not impair the use
of its coastal waters: already wastes are conveyed by pipes be-
yond territorial waters and projects are afoot to discharge wastes
of whole regions many miles from the coast where currents can
disperse them or carry them, hopefully diluted, to other coun-
tries. Such projects, however, can provide but temporary relief;
not only is total ocean pollution not diminished but, in time,
international disputes are bound to arise.
I do not, of course, intend to suggest that we are yet close
to facing the necessity of closing the ocean to all human use,
as Cousteau suggested might one day be necessary: the oceans
can undoubtedly stand much abuse. But already the serious
consequences of present practices are being felt. Pollution threat-
ens some fisheries, and in many coastal areas mariculture is
impossible: more than one-tenth of the shellfish producing waters
in the United States are already unusable.
I would mention one further recent and very important
development. Man has acquired the ability seriously to affect
the ocean far from the site of his intervention, not merely
through pollution. I do not refer so much to contemporary re-
search on the possibility of diverting ocean currents to benefit
the climate of some countries or to the possible use of nuclear
explosives for seabed exploitation, but to more subtle forms of
intervention. For instance, completion of the Aswan dam, by
halting the annual release of Nile water into the Mediterranean,
has increased the salinity and density of the surface water of
the Eastern Mediterranean and has diminished the number of
fish previously supported by the nutrient elements supplied to
the sea by the river water.
We are witnessing also an intensification of exploitation of
the oceans. In the field of fisheries, the world catch has trebled
since 1938 from around 20 to over 60 million tons, and the catch
is expected to double again within the next fifteen years through
the use of deeper trawls and the exploitation of less desirable
species of fish. But already there are misgivings; Soviet aca-
demician Boris Bykhovsky believes that present fishing methods
are leading to a depletion of some fish stocks. This opinion seems
to be borne out by our experience. Several whale species have
already been virtually destroyed; while overfished stocks which
in 1949 included only a few high-priced species such as plaice,
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halibut, or salmon now include some tunas, cod, ocean perch,
and even the North Atlantic herring. Further, fleets cannot con-
tinue indefinitely to move from an overfished area to another
more distant and less fished.
About a dozen states are still responsible for some three-
quarters of the world catch. They have negotiated agreements
for the conservation of specific fishing stocks; sometimes based
on the principle of abstention, more often on the principle of
preference for the coastal state. A number of inter-governmental
bodies, such as the Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission,
and many others, have been established by treaty between some
or all of these countries for the purpose of regulating commer-
cial fishing and adopting conservation measures for particular
stocks of fish. But, new nations are building or expanding their
fishing fleets. Fishing methods are becoming more efficient, and
it is virtually impossible to enforce an impartial and credible
regulation of the catch of commercial fishermen on the basis
of present inter-governmental mechanisms. Consequently, fishing
is becoming more competitive and economically wasteful; cost
of production per unit of catch is rising; and there is danger
that the quantity and quality of the world catch may decline
in the long term instead of increasing, as it could and should in
the case of most fish stocks, were it possible rationally to apply
the principle of the "maximum sustainable yield."
Furthermore, as Holt rightly observes, schemes for the cul-
tivation of highly valued species of fish by transplanting the
young to good high seas feeding areas or projects aimed at
increasing yields by rearing young fish to viable size, are frus-
trated by the lack of protection afforded to investments by pres-
ent international legal norms.5 Absence of international norms
also discourages the substantial investments required to develop
and to exploit the mineral resources of the seabed.
In short, the unprecedented and accelerating development
of technology which is making possible the intensified use and
exploitation of ocean space for an increasing variety of purposes
and in all its dimensions-surface, subsurface, and bottom-
offers immense opportunities to mankind but also the immense
5. Holt, The Food Resources of the Ocean, ScImNTmFc AMERICAN 178 (Sept.
1969).
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danger of cumulative adverse change in a vital environment
unless international norms are elaborated and institutions cre-
ated to bring under the rule of law the fundamentally new sit-
uation which is emerging. International law must be capable of
insuring that use and exploitation of ocean space take place in
a manner that maximizes the possibilities of beneficial utilization,
encourages scientific research, and minimizes conflicts and dan-
gers to the marine environment. This present international law
cannot do because of fragmentation of competence and absence
of authority.
Contemporary international law, as embodied in the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea,6 subjects a narrow but not pre-
cisely defined band of water-the territorial sea-to the full
sovereignty of the coastal state and a wider band of water-
called the contiguous zone-to coastal state control for the pur-
pose of preventing infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigra-
tion, or sanitary regulations.7
Beyond the contiguous zone there are the high seas. These
are open to all nations: nobody may appropriate the high seas,
nor does anybody bear responsibility for that area. The free-
doms of the high seas comprise freedom of navigation, freedom
of fishing, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, free-
dom of overflight,8 and freedom of scientific research is gen-
erally considered to be also included in the formulation of article
2 of the Convention on the High Seas of April 28, 1958.9 The
freedom of the high seas has meant in practice the freedom of all
states to use the high seas as they thought best, subject only to
"reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their exercise
of the freedom of the high seas."'1 Grotius based the concept of
the freedom of the high seas on the supposed physical impossi-
bility of exercising the same type of dominion over the oceans
as on land. That concept basically rests on three postulates:
6. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done
April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effec-
tive Sept. 10, 1964).
7. Id. art. 24, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1612, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 211
(effective Sept. 10, 1964).
8. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, art. 2, [1962] 2 U.S.T.
2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 20, 1962).
9. Id. See also Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958,
art. 5, para. 8, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 474, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 316 (effective
June 10, 1964).
10. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, art. 2, [1962] 2 U.S.T.
2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962).
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(a) that the seas are so immense that conflict deriving from
competing or conflicting uses is unlikely; (b) that the potential
of the oceans in living resources is virtually inexhaustible; and
(c) that the danger of large scale impairment of the marine
environment is remote. These assumptions, however, are rapidly
becoming invalid, since they are increasingly contradicted by
experience. Conflicting uses of the sea are increasingly trouble-
some, desirable stocks of living marine resources are increasingly
endangered, and ocean pollution is becoming a real threat: these
developments are causing an increasing number of coastal states
to regulate navigation and fishing in some areas of the high seas.
Yet, attempts to change present international law governing the
seas and the exploitation of their living resources into accord-
ance with present needs which require a measure of interna-
tional administration are unlikely to be successful at this stage
in view of the multiplicity of rooted, extensive, and conflicting
national interests and the vast body of existing customary and
conventional international law on the subject.
International management of the oceans and their resources
may be necessary in the interests of all; but, until present chaos
is further compounded, until ocean living resources are seen
globally to become scarcer, and until the ecology of the oceans
is visibly and gravely impaired over the greater part of our
planet, it is to be feared that states will prefer to continue with
the present system, seeking to mitigate the negative effects of
absence of authority and uncontrolled use by bringing ever
wider areas of the seas under national regulation. This is occur-
ring with increasing frequency; recently, for instance, Canada
advanced a claim to special rights in Arctic waters, ostensibly
to prevent their pollution." This attitude, which is ultimately
self-defeating and appears incomprehensible, is due in part to
international political rivalries and in part to the reluctance of
states to surrender any of their legal rights under international
law to achieve a common beneficial purpose for all unless the
imminence of common disaster makes such surrender impera-
tive.
While a considerable, although largely outdated, body of
international law exists for the seas, there is virtually no law
with regard to the seabed. From a geological point of view the
11. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, C-202, Second Session, 28th
Parliament, 18-19 Eliz. 11, 1969-70.
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land underlying the seas and oceans is divided into continental
shelf, continental slope and the abyss. The continental shelf can
be defined as that area of the sea or ocean floor between the
mean low water line and that sharp change in the inclination
of the floor, occurring usually around the 130 to 150 meter
isobath, which marks the landward edge of the continental
slope.12 The width of both the geological shelf and of the slope
varies widely in different parts of the world. The abyss or ocean
floor is a rolling plain scarred by deep gorges, called trenches,
and studded by seamounts and guyots. Ocean basins are fre-
quently separated by great mountain ranges, the peaks of which
sometimes rise above the water.18
A variety of minerals-tin, diamonds, and phosphorite-are
known to lie on the geologic continental shelf and have long
been mined. Under the shelf floor, sulphur and vast quanities of
hydrocarbons have been found and are being increasingly ex-
ploited. Some sixteen percent of world petroleum production
is of offshore origin. This percentage may well double within
the next ten years.
The continental slope is also known to contain gas and petro-
leum, but the means for their exploitation are only now becoming
available. Little is known of the mineral resources of the abyss,
beyond the vast quantities of manganese nodules containing
manganese, copper, nickel, cobalt, iron, and other minerals in
varying concentration. In some oceanic trenches, there are hot
muds containing rich concentrations of gold, silver, copper, and
zinc ores.14
Until the second world war, legal interest in the land under-
lying the world oceans was confined almost exclusively to rather
12. In strict geological terminology, the continental shelf begins with
the upland coastal plain and extends seaward until a marked increase in
slope occurs. See Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 53 NAY. WAR COLL. BL. BK. SER. 16 (1961); 1 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND
S A BOUNDARIES 182-183 (1962). Legally, the Convention on the Continental
Shelf defines the continental shelf as "the seabed and subsoil of the sub-
marine areas adjacent to the coast [including the coasts of islands] but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas." Convention on the
Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 1, 1964, 1 U.S.T. 473, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 (effective June 10, 1964).
13. Menard, The Deep Ocean Floor, SCIENTirIC AMERICAN 127 (Sept. 1969).
14. Wenk, The Physical Resources of the Ocean, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
167, 172 (1969).
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theoretical legal disputes as to whether it should be considered
res omniun communis or res nullius.
The Truman Proclamation of 194515 introduced a new era.
The Proclamation declared that since modern technology was
capable of exploiting the resources of the continental shelf, since
recognized jurisdiction over these resources was necessary, and
since the exercise of such jurisdiction was just and reasonable,
the United States regarded the resources of the shelf contiguous
to it as "appertaining to the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction and control" without in any way affecting the status
of the waters above the shelf as high seas. The continental shelf
was not defined in the proclamation, but a subsequent State
Department press release stated that it was delimited by the
100 fathom isobath.16
The Truman Proclamation was followed by pronouncements
from a number of states asserting various rights, including sov-
ereignty, over areas of the seabed extending to varying distances
from their coasts. Even a decade later, political, economic, and
legal interest was confined to the shallow waters of the geologic
continental shelf. Thus, when the International Law Commission
studied the problem, it saw no reason to suggest any international
norms for the area beyond the continental shelf; none were con-
sequently included in the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Con-
vention, and none exist today except for: (a) the general obli-
gation to exercise regard to the interests of other states in the
use of the seabed; (b) the freedom to lay submarine pipes and
cables; and (c) a general obligation for states to draft regula-
tions to prevent pollution of the seas resulting from the ex-
ploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, 17 and
from the dumping of radioactive wastes.18 Needless to say, not
all states have complied with the latter obligations.
Thus some attempt at regulation under international law
exists today only with regard to the continental shelf. The con-
tents of the relevant convention-the 1958 Geneva Convention
of the Continental Shelf-seem curiously irrelevant, however,
15. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945); 13 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 485
(1945).
16. See 13 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 484 (1945).
17. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, art. 24, [1962 2
U.S.T. 2319, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 96 (effective Sept. 30, 1962).
18. Id. art. 25, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2319, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 96 (effec-
tive Sept. 30, 1962).
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to the real problems of ocean space. The main thrust of the
Convention is to assure the soverign rights of coastal states to
explore and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf
adjacent to their coasts."' There are elaborate rules for the
delimitation of a shelf shared by two or more states,20 but only
one article-article five-lays down any rules with regard to
accommodation between different uses of the seabed. The Con-
vention nowhere limits the power of a coastal state to utilize
the seabed in a manner that may endanger marine ecology or
that may result in large scale pollution of the seas, and there
is no reference to international responsibility of states for dam-
age caused to other states through careless or irresponsible use
of their continental shelves.
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf is
best known for its ambiguous definition of the legal shelf, which
reads as follows:
"For the purpose of these articles, the term continental
shelf is used as referring: (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of
the territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the
seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to
islands."21
Although the definition contains ambiguities, I am satisfied
that at the time the Convention was framed, it was intended to
use the word "adjacent" in its normal sense of "near to" and
that this word was intended to govern both the depth criterion
of 200 meters and the exploitability criterion. Thus, I read the
definition as indicating that submarine areas situated under
waters less than 200 meters deep and deeper areas which are
exploitable are subject to national jurisdiction only if they are
reasonably near to the coast.
This, however, is now a minority opinion. It is generally
assumed that the entire area of the seabed under less than 200
19. See, e.g., Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958,
art. 2, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 (effective June
10, 1964).
20. Id. art. 6, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 474, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 316 (effec-
tive June 10, 1964).
21. Id. art. 1, [1964) 1 U.S.T. 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 (effec-
tive June 10, 1964).
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meters of water is ipso facto under the limited sovereignty of
the coastal state, even if hundreds of miles distant from the
coast. Some states, and the National Petroleum Council,22 even
take the position that the entire submerged land mass-including
continental slope and rise-has been placed under the jurisdic-
tion of the coastal state by the 1958 Geneva Convention.
Sometimes suggestions have been advanced that, since ex-
ploitability is a wasting limitation which will gradually disap-
pear with the progress of technology, every coastal state will
eventually be able to claim as continental shelf all the seabed
from its coasts until it meets the seabed of another coastal state.
For the time being, this argument is a dead issue since the de-
bates and arguments in the United Nations have shown a virtual
unanimity in the rejection of that view. But the argument may
be revived if progress is not made in reaching a consensus on a
precise definition of the limits of national jurisdiction.
To some extent, the different interpretations regarding the
width of the legal continental shelf under the 1958 Convention
reflect genuine uncertainties; to some extent, however, they may
be but a legal peg on which to hang the protection of political
or economic interests. Thus for instance, a wide legal shelf-
comprising geological shelf, slope, and rise-would enable de-
veloped coastal states to exploit, as they wish and without fear
of competition, any mineral resources likely to be accessible and
commercially exploitable for some time in the future. Less
technologically advanced coastal states could sell exploitation
rights to those possessing capital and technology. A narrow shelf
would on the other hand enable landlocked countries and those
with limited access to the sea to share in the benefits derived
from resources of most of the seabeds of the world.
The issue, however, has deeper implications. We should view
the problem in the light of what is happening in ocean space as
a whole and in the light of the probable consequences of our
decisions. Thus, as Professor Henkin observes, "the principal
reasons for insisting on a narrow shelf are the reasons that have
kept the territorial sea narrow-competing interests and uses
in the sea. Most States are coastal States and in that capacity
would of course wish to extend coastal State jurisdiction. But
22. See Petroleum Resources under the Ocean Floor (March 1969), pre-
pared by the National Petroleum Council's Committee on Petroleum Re-
sources under the Ocean Floor.
[VOL. 31
DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN SPACE
many States have other interests in the sea which run counter
to coastal State exclusivity . . . military activities, navigation,
fishing .... [T]he 1958 Convention was compelled to recognize
new rights in the coastal State to regulate navigation and
scientific research: inevitably there has been some interference
with navigation; all are agreed that scientific research has suf-
fered grieviously. A wider shelf will enable the coastal State to
interfere with such other uses of the sea in a wide and expanding
area."23 Professor Henkin also points out that exclusive rights
for some purposes tend to become exclusive rights for other
purposes and that there is no compelling reason why a coastal
state should have exclusive rights in the seabed but not in the
superjacent waters or in the airspace above.
Despite the convincing reasons advanced by Professor Hen-
kin for a narrow shelf, the trend is in the opposite direction.
States are increasingly claiming or asserting jurisdiction over
ever wider areas of the seabed and superjacent waters. There
are several reasons for this trend: the ambiguity of present in-
ternational law; security considerations; the anxiety of states
to exclude others from exploiting ocean resources near their
coasts, etc. But the long term consequences could be disastrous:
increasing ocean pollution, curtailment of scientific research,
tension and conflict between states, massive economic waste,
and so on.
It was mainly in order to halt the increasing erosion of world
community interest and to seek to establish an effective inter-
national legal regime in ocean space that would protect equally
the legitimate interests of all states and the international com-
munity that my government three years ago suggested in the
United Nations:
(1) Adoption of the concept of common heritage of
mankind to govern the legal regulation of the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction. As a consequence of the adoption of
this concept, this area should not be appropriated by any
state, should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes,
and should be exploited primarily in the interests of man-
kind with special regard to the needs of poor countries; and
23. Henkin, The Extent of the Continental Shelf, PREPARATORY CONFERENCE
ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CONTINENTAL SHELF, PACEM IN MARBJUS 18-19
(February 1970).
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(2) That exploration, use, and exploitation of the sea-
bed beyond national jurisdiction should be conducted in a
manner consistent with the principles and purposes of
the United Nations Charter and without causing serious
impairment of the marine environment.
We suggested a declaration of principles by the United
Nations embodying these basic points among others, to be fol-
lowed by the establishment of a United Nations Committee to
negotiate a comprehensive treaty which would:
(a) precisely define the limits of national jurisdiction;
(b) safeguard the interests of the world community and
the international character of the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction; and
(c) establish an agency, linked to, but not necessarily
part of, the United Nations system to assume jurisdiction,
not as a sovereign, but as a trustee for all countries, over
the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.
In view of the unity of ocean space, the agency was en-
visaged as having global competence over the marine environ-
ment. We have stated in the United Nations Seabed Committee
that, "while the competence of the agency should be global,
it need not, in fact it cannot, be the same in all parts of the
marine environment. In waters within the territorial sovereignty
of a state, the competence of an international agency can only
be of an advisory nature. Established interests of states and a
considerable body of international law exist with regard to the
high seas and their living resources; the functions of an inter-
national agency with regard to this part of the marine environ-
ment must therefore be confined to facilitating and harmonizing
national activities with functions substantially similar to those
being undertaken, in fragmented and insufficiently coordinated
fashion, by half a dozen agencies within the United Nations
system. On the other hand, with regard to the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction, we think that it is essential that whatever
international machinery is established be able to provide not
only for the allocation of exclusive rights to the development
of non-living resources, but also for the management of these
resources. It is of course essential that development take place
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in such a manner that a substantial portion of the benefits will
accrue to developing countries. '24
THE SABED BEYoND NATIONAL JURISDICTION
International law has traditionally served the following
functions:
(1) to prevent conflict;
(2) to establish predictability, that is, the ability to foresee
what activities can be undertaken with reasonable assur-
ance that other states will acquiesce; and
(3) to establish an accommodation and equilibrium between
different, and sometimes conflicting, interests of mem-
bers of the international community.
Increasingly, however, the functions of international law
are broadened. The great increase in the size of the interna-
tional community and the physical internationalization of the
world have increased the need to deal with many problems,
formerly dealt with on a bilateral or regional basis, in a broad
multilateral context in order to avoid a multiplicity of some-
times inconsistent arrangements with essentially the same pur-
pose. Increasingly also, international law must deal with the
common needs and interests of the world community. This new
function of international law rests on the vital need to insure
that the environment of this planet remains hospitable to human
life and to man's activities.
In presenting its proposals to the General Assembly, the
underlying and essential aim of my government was to make a
contribution towards the realization of this latter fundamental
objective. More specifically, my government had in mind the
establishment by international agreement of a regime for the
seabed which would give credible assurance of effectively
realizing the following goals:
(1) to provide for prevention of conflict and for peaceful
settlement of disputes;
24. Statement of A. Pardo before the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, March 20, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR. 1-11 at 6
(1969).
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(2) to provide norms for the management and control of
ocean space for human benefit;
(3) to provide norms for the accommodation both of differ-
ent uses of the seabed and between uses of the seabed
and uses of the superjacent waters;
(4) to encourage scientific and technological research and
the wide dissemination of its results;
(5) to insure the economically efficient use of the vast, but
not unlimited, resources of the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction; and
(6) to enable all countries, including less advanced coun-
tries, effectively to participate in the economic bene-
fits to be derived from the exploitation of the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction.
My government's proposals at the 1967 session of the United
Nations General Assembly were hotly debated. On the one
hand, a considerable number of countries, mainly technologically
less advanced, were eager to adopt immediately a resolution
proclaiming the seabed beyond national jurisdiction to be the
common heritage of mankind, freezing claims to further exten-
sions of national jurisdiction, adopting the principles suggested
by my government for the use of the seabed, and establishing
a permanent United Nations committee to negotiate an inter-
national agreement which would establish an international regime
and provide for the creation of an agency to administer the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Several technologically
advanced countries, however, while not objecting to the estab-
lishment of a United Nations committee, felt that time was
required to study all the facts and their implications before
taking a definite position on the proposed declaration of prin-
ciples. In this connection, Ambassador Goldberg of the United
States proposed the establishment of a United Nations Com-
mittee on the Oceans to consider all marine questions, promote
international cooperation in marine science, and consider ques-
tions of law relating to marine problems. Finally the Soviet
Union and a few other states, while acknowledging the con-
siderable interest of the topic raised by my government, sug-
gested that the General Assembly refer the subject back to
governments for comment before taking any action. At the
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suggestion of Malta, an informal group was appointed to draft
proposals that might receive general support by the United
Nations General Assembly. On the recommendation of this
group, a cautious resolution was unanimously adopted by the
General Assembly. 25 The resolution established a 35 member
ad hoc committee to: (a) make a survey of existing interna-
tional agreements and past and present activities of the United
Nations system with regard to the seabed; and (b) provide
an account of the scientific, technical, economic, legal, and other
aspects of the problem together with "an indication of practical
means to promote international cooperation in the exploration,
conservation and use of the seabed and of their resources ...
taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions
put forward by Member States....
The ad hoc committee held three meetings in 1968. Two
working groups were established: one to deal with legal matters,
and the other with economic and technical matters. Preliminary
views of governments were sought and comprehensive docu-
mentation prepared by the United Nations Secretariat was
studied.
Probably no one would be interested in a blow-by-blow
account of the debates in the ad hoc committee, but much of
its work, particularly the studies prepared by the United Nations
Secretariat on the resources of the seabed, on the state of the
technology for their exploitation, and on the legal aspects of
the question of the reservation of the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of man-
kind, are of great interest and have an important educational
function.
Nevertheless, progress on the substance of the matter was
limited. There emerged an informal agreement that an area
of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction did exist; there was
a general feeling that the seabed should be reserved exclusively
for peaceful purposes (but there was disagreement on whether
this term excluded all military uses of the seabed); a United
States initiative to launch an international decade of ocean
25. G.A. Res. 2340(XXII), U.N. Doe. A/RES/2340 (1967).
26. Id.; the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Juris-
diction, U.N. Doe. A/7230, was adopted by the Committee on August 30, 1968,
and was subsequently delivered to the 23d Session of the General Assembly.
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exploration was welcomed and met with general support; and
finally, there was overwhelming support for the establishment of
a standing committee.
At the last meeting of the ad hoc committee in August,
1968, two tentative sets of principles were submitted: one-
a draft declaration of general principles-was supported mainly
by technologically less advanced countries; the other-a draft
declaration of agreed principles-was favored by technologically
advanced countries.
At its 1968 session the General Assembly endorsed the
concept of an International Decade of Ocean Exploration,27 and
after considerable discussion adopted three other portions of
a resolution which marked a further slight advance in its
consideration of the question of the seabed. Resolution 2467A
(XXIII) established a 42 member Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction and instructed it to: (a) study the elabora-
tion of legal principles and norms which would promote inter-
national cooperation in the exploration and use of the seabed
and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and
to ensure the exploitation of their resources for the benefit
of mankind; (b) study the ways of promoting the exploitation
and use of the resources of this area . . . taking into account
the foreseeable development of technology; (c) review studies
carried out in the field of exploration and research in this
area . . . ; and (d) examine proposed measures of cooperation
to be adopted by the international community . . . to prevent
the marine pollution which may result from the exploration and
exploitation of the resources of the area.28 The General Assembly
also called on the committee to study further the exclusive
reservation for peaceful purposes of the seabed and ocean floor
without prejudice to the limits which may be agreed upon in
this respect.
By resolution 2467B (XXIII) the General Assembly requested
the Secretary-General to undertake a study of all aspects of
the protection of the living and other resources of the seabed
against the consequences of pollution and other harmful effects
arising from exploration and exploitation.29
27. G.A. Res. 2467D(XXIII), U.N. Doe. A/7477 (1968).
28. G.A. Res. 2467A(XXIII), U.N. Doe. A/7477 (1968).
29. G.A. Res. 2467B(XXIII), U.N. Doc. A/7477 (1968).
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Finally, by resolution 2467C (XXIII) the Secretary-General
was requested to undertake a study on the question of estab-
lishing in due time appropriate international machinery for the
promotion of the exploration and exploitation of the resources
of the area. The Soviet Union and eight other eastern European
countries voted against this resolution and some twenty-five
countries abstained, including: some technologically advanced
countries such as Canada, Australia, the United States, France,
and the United Kingdom; some countries friendly to the Soviet
Union, such as the United Arab Republic, Cuba, Syria, Congo
(Brazzaville), Portugal, and the Union of South Africa; and a
few developing countries such as Madagascar, Malawi, and Upper
Volta.80
As the ad hoc committee had done the previous year, the
United Nations Seabed Committee held three sessions.81 In the
legal sub-committee, work was concentrated in an attempt to
draft legal principles, generally acceptable to all members, with
regard to the legal status of the seabed beyond national juris-
diction which would be calculated to promote international
cooperation in the exploration and use of this area. The different
elements which could be included in a declaration of principles
were examined in depth, but despite long discussions and
informal negotiations between delegations it was found im-
possible to arrive at an agreement on the contents of a declara-
tion of principles. In the end the rapporteur of the Committee
decided to add a short chapter to the Committee's report (U.N.
document A/7622) outlining areas of agreement. These were
somewhat broader than in the preceding year and may be sum-
marized as follows:
1) There is an area of the seabed which is beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction;
2) This area shall not be subject to national appropriation
by any means, and no state shall claim sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part of it;
30. G.A. Res. 2467C(XXIII), U.N. Doe. A/7477 (1968). On the adoption
of these four resolutions, see Haight, The Seabed and the Ocean Floor, 3
THE INT'L LAWYER 642 (1969).
31. On the work of the Permanent Seabed Committee, see U.N. Seabed
Committee Concludes Spring Session, 60 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 342 (1969) and
August Session of U.N. Seabed Committee held at New York, 61 DEP'T OF
STATE BULL. 285 (1969).
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3) There are principles and norms of international law
which apply to the seabed beyond national jurisdiction;
4) The widest possible area of the seabed should be reserved
exclusively for peaceful purposes;
5) There is need to establish a regime for the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction; its resources should be used in the
interests of mankind, irrespective of the geographical
location of states and taking into account the special
needs and interests of the developing countries;
6) The idea that freedom of scientific research in the sea-
bed beyond national jurisdiction should be assured with-
out discrimination and that states should promote inter-
national cooperation in the conduct of scientific research
carried out with the intention of open publication, com-
manded general support; and
7) The adoption of appropriate safeguards to protect the
living resources of the marine environment and of ap-
propriate safety measures concerning activities on the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction were also generally
supported.
Agreement on these points, however, was not sufficient
to conceal the widely divergent approaches of states. Thus,
there was no agreement on the need to establish a precise
boundary for the area of the seabed beyond national juris-
diction; there was no agreement on the extent to which present
rules of international law would be applicable to the area
beyond national jurisdiction; there was no agreement on the
scope of the prohibition of military activities as well as on
many other important points, including whether the future
regime should apply to the area, or only to its resources, and
whether the regime should be characterized as legal, inter-
national, or agreed.
Generally speaking, technologically advanced countries ap-
peared to favor early and precise delimitation of that area
of the seabed which should be considered within national juris-
diction and a short and simple declaration of principles. How-
ever, the views of the Soviet Union and of technologically
advanced western countries differed substantially on other
points.
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The Soviet Union and other socialist countries (except
Yugoslavia) were silent or vague with regard to the regime
that should be established for the seabed beyond national juris-
diction. They appeared to favor a treaty that would give them
unrestricted access to this area and free use and exploitation
of its resources. The socialist countries also favored total pro-
hibition of any military use of the ocean floor beyond a twelve
mile coastal zone. They were opposed to applying the concept
of common heritage of mankind to the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction and even more strongly opposed to the creation of
any international mechanism to implement any provisions of a
seabed treaty. Finally, the Soviet Union was not prepared to dis-
cuss the question of state responsibility for damages caused
by activities on the seabed.
Technologically advanced Western countries conceded the
need to establish an international regime for the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction and several were willing to accept a
proposal to refrain from granting exclusive rights to their
nationals over any part of this area except as provided by the
regime. Some Western countries were also prepared to accept
a reference to the concept of common heritage in the preamble
of any declaration of principles, and they generally agreed to
the creation of a mechanism, such as an international registry
office, with the function of allocating exclusive rights to the
exploitation of resources in the seabed beyond national juris-
diction. In a significant statement, the United States repre-
sentative declared that his country would support the concept
of levying moderate royalties on the benefits derived from
exploitation of the area beyond national jurisdiction and
allocating a portion of such royalties to international community
purposes. Western countries were cautious on the question of
state liability for damages. Finally, with regard to the question
of peaceful uses of the seabed, Western countries generally
supported the view that complete demilitarization was unrealistic
in the present state of world tension and that, therefore, it was
practical to negotiate only limited arms control measures ban-
ning the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction on the seabed.
A fairly wide range of views was also expressed by develop-
ing countries. Generally speaking, however, the great majority
of these countries supported an elaborate declaration of prin-
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ciples that would close most of the options that technologically
advanced countries sought to keep open. Developing countries
generally favored demilitarization of the widest possible area
of the ocean floor; inclusion of the concept of common heritage
of mankind in the operative part of any declaration of principles
regarding the seabed; the conclusion of a comprehensive and
detailed treaty establishing an international regime with pro-
vision for the establishment of elaborate machinery to regulate,
coordinate, supervise, and control all activities on the seabed
beyond national jurisdiction; and a few developing countries
even expressed the opinion that the international machinery to
be established should itself exploit the resources of the seabed
and that the financial benefits derived from exploitation should
be divided directly among the developing countries on some
sort of pro rata basis rather than applied to economic develop-
ment through international agencies such as the World Bank
or the United Nations Development Programme. Strong links
were desired by most developing countries between the ma-
chinery or agency to be established and the United Nations, and
it was contended that the agency should be controlled by states
on the one state-one vote principle. With regard to the question
of delimitation of limits, many developing countries took a rather
ambiguous position. At one extreme, a relatively small group
of countries believed that the question of delimitation was not
within the competence of the United Nations Seabed Committee
and, in any case, was irrelevant to the discussion of a legal
regime, referring in this connection to the fact that it had been
possible to conclude a treaty with regard to outer space although
its precise boundaries had not yet been defined. Other develop-
ing countries, while agreeing that the question of boundaries
was relevant to the establishment of a regime for the area,
believed that this should not inhibit progress in the elaboration
of legal principles to guide the activities of states in the explora-
tion and use of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Finally,
still others called for the convening of a conference either to
review the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf or to
review both this convention and the other conventions on the
law of the sea.
While the work of the legal subcommittee was marked by
wide divergence of views, sometimes heated discussion, and only
limited agreement, the economic and technical subcommittee
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examined the matters within its competence in a more har-
monious manner. Agreement was reached on a large number
of points regarding methods to be employed in the exploration
and exploitation of seabed resources, and regarding procedures
for the acquisition of exclusive rights. Various formulae were
examined for the granting of exploitation titles, and measures
to minimize ocean pollution and increase safety in the exploita-
tion of the seabed were studied. Finally, the draft outline of
the studies to be undertaken under the International Decade of
Ocean Exploration, which had been prepared by the Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commission, was examined and
several recommendations were made thereon.
While the United Nations Seabed Committee was debating
in New York, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva was
examining two draft treaties on the peaceful uses of the seabed
submitted respectively by the United States and by the Soviet
Union. After considerable negotiation between the two Powers,
the drafts were consolidated into one 'draft treaty on the prohibi-
tion of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof. By this draft the United States accepted the
Soviet view that measures to control the military uses of the
seabed should apply to the area beyond twelve miles from the
coast. In turn, the Soviet Union departed temporarily from its
claim of complete demilitarization of the seabed.
The XXIVth session of the General Assembly last winter
marked a confrontation between most of the developing coun-
tries which enjoy a majority in the United Nations and the
technologically more advanced countries of both' East and West
which have in their hands the preponderance of ;vorld power.
In view of the fundamental disagreements which had emerged
during the preceding year, it was found impossible to draft a
declaration of principles which would obtain a meaningful
majority. Despite this at least a dozen draft resolutions were
submitted of which four were eventually pressed to a vote and
adopted as resolution 2574A to D.
Resolution 2574A, as sponsored by Malta, requested, "The
Secretary General to ascertain the views of Member States on
the desirability of convening at an early date a conference
particularly in order to arrive at a clear, precise and inter-
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nationally accepted definition of the area of the seabed . . .
which lies beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. .. ." The
draft resolution was strongly objected to by those States which
had maintained in committee the irrelevance of considering the
question of limits for the purpose of establishing a regime.
After efforts to convince the Maltese 'delegation to withdraw
its draft resolution failed, and since it appeared that the reso-
lution would be adopted by a considerable majority, the states
opposed to consideration of the question of delimitation of the
legal continental shelf, decided to link this question to that of
a review of the three other Geneva Conventions (Convention
on the Territorial Sea, Convention on the High Seas, and Con-
vention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas), possibly in the hope of delaying
considerably a decision by the international community on the
question of the precise limits of the legal continental shelf.
The amendment submitted in this connection was adopted. Thus
it is probable that in three or four years time we may have a
new conference on the law of the sea, but it is an open question
whether such a conference will be more successful than the
conference held ten years ago.
Resolution 2574B, which requests the Seabed Committee to
expedite its work of preparing a comprehensive and balanced
statement of principles, was adopted virtually unanimously,
while only the Socialist countries opposed resolution 2574C
requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a study "covering
in depth the status, structure, functions and powers of an inter-
national machinery having jurisdiction over the peaceful uses
of the seabed ... including the power to regulate, coordinate,
supervise and control all activities relating to the exploration
and exploitation of their resources . . ." Resolution 2574D, how-
ever, which declared that, "pending the establishment of an
international regime, States .. . are bound to refrain from all
activities of exploitation of the resources ... of the seabed ...
beyond national jurisdiction" gave rise to an acrimonious debate.
Nearly all technologically advanced countries strongly opposed
the draft resolution contending that it was vague, since the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction was not defined, and that its
adoption would 'discourage the necessary development of seabed
resources, or, alternatively, that adoption of the resolution would
encourage States to further extend their national jurisdiction.
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Nevertheless, the resolution was adopted by a substantial
majority. Only time will tell whether it will have significant
practical effects.
The debate on the draft treaty on the emplacement of nuclear
weapons on the seabed marked a further loss of influence of the
major powers with the General Assembly majority. The criti-
cisms of the draft treaty that were most widely supported were
probably: (a) lack of an article to the effect that further nego-
tiations would be conducted in good faith to widen the scope
of the prohibition of military activities; (b) reference to article
24(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone as indicating the extent of the area of application of the
draft treaty; (c) lack of clear provisions permitting the partici-
pation of coastal states in the verification of suspected violations
of the draft treaty. A number of other criticisms and suggestions
were also made with the result that the draft treaty was with-
drawn for further consideration by the Committee on Dis-
armament.
In March 1970, the United Nations Seabed Committee met
for its first session this year. A determined attempt was made
to comply with the terms of resolution 2574B, but again little
progress was made. In the legal subcommittee, the leading de-
veloping countries presented a draft resolution on principles
which, while marking a technical and stylistic improvement on
previous drafts, contained a number of points totally unaccept-
able to the United States and to Soviet Union. An attempt by
the rapporteur of the legal subcommittee to include in one paper
major alternative formulations of different principles resulted
in a formidable document the contents of which are almost
entirely included within simple, double, or even treble brackets!
The net results of a four-week session have unfortunately ap-
peared to be increased rigidity in the positions of many delega-
tions and an increasing tendency to consider the establishment
of an international regime for the seabed from the point of
view of group affinities.
The economic and technical subcommittee started its work
in a more constructive spirit. The representative of the United
States submitted two useful papers: one on the objectives to
be served by an international regime governing the exploration
and exploitation of seabed resources; the other containing a
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suggested list of topics, mainly of a technical nature for detailed
discussion. The United Kingdom presented interesting proposals
on the nature and scope of an international regime as did the
representative of El Salvador; and the Soviet Union in sub-
mitting some proposals for study appeared to be moving slightly
from its previously rather negative position, but the acrimony
of the debates in the legal subcommittee eventually influenced
the course of the discussion in the economic and technical sub-
committee with the result that at the end of the session, it was
impossible even to agree on the priority of topics to be con-
sidered at the August session of the committee.
Clearly we have reached a crossroads in the consideration
by the United Nations of the question raised by Malta with
high hopes two and half years ago. There can be no doubt that
as soon as technology for economic exploitation becomes avail-
able, the seabed will be exploited at ever increasing depths and
at ever increasing distances from the coast. Indeed this process
is taking place before our eyes and is inevitable. The only ques-
tion is whether exploitation will take place without excessive
conflict of uses, in a peaceful atmosphere offering expanding
opportunities to all states, and with some consideration to the
preservation of the ecology of the marine environment; or
whether it will take place in an atmosphere of tension without
regard to the long term interests of the international com-
munity.
Lack of agreement on three difficult problems of a funda-
mental nature, each of which resolves itself into a series of
other problems, appears to be the main obstacle to progress.
The first of these fundamental problems concerns the nature of
the basic concept that should govern the exploration, use, and
exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Will
it be the traditional concept of freedom of the high seas or
the new concept of common heritage?
The second fundamental difficulty is the nature of the
regime which it is proposed to establish, and the scope of its
competence. Should, for instance, the regime contain some norms
concerning military uses of the seabed, or should these be nego-
tiated separately? Should the proposed regime cover the area
and all its uses, at least potentially, or should it deal only
with the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
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area? Should a regime provide for the creation of an inter-
governmental mechanism and if so, what should be the scope
and nature of its competence? For instance, should the inter-
national mechanism be given the power to administer and
manage the seabed for the international community or should
its competence be limited to the registration of claims of exclu-
sive rights to the exploitation of resources? In the event that
it is found desirable to create an international mechanism with
wide competence and strong powers, how can the conflicting
interests of states be balanced in such a way as to insure both
the viability of the regime and the impartiality of action of the
international mechanism?
Finally, what are the limits of national jurisdiction over
the seabed, or to put the matter in another way, what are the
limits of the area beyond national jurisdiction to which the
international regime which it is proposed to establish should
apply? What criteria should be adopted for defining the limits
of national jurisdiction-depth, distance from the coast, the
concept of the continental block? Should the criteria adopted
be equally applicable both to coastal states and to all islands
indiscriminately?
The three complexes of problems which I have mentioned
are closely interconnected and in many cases novel. They also
involve issues of quite fundamental importance to many states.
It is not surprising, therefore, that progress in reaching agree-
ment at the United Nations has been painfully slow. It will be
necessary, however, to advance more rapidly in the future, since
deliberations are being overtaken by rapidly developing tech-
nology.
As Mr. Stevenson, legal adviser to the State Department,
declared this year:
"The community of nations has before it a set of funda-
mental decisions regarding well over half the earth. It
must decide whether the clear rule of law rather than force
of arms will govern international relations in the seas.
It must decide whether international cooperation for the
benefit of all mankind or mystic national pride will dominate
the oceans. In a most fundamental sense it must decide
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whether the order of the day is an accommodation of legi-
timate interests or a clash of positions." 2
From the nature of the decisions which will be made we
will know whether present international law based on the pos-
tulate of the absolute sovereignty of the national state can
develop new concepts effectively to deal with the common
interests of the world community. The precedents which the
United Nations is establishing are critical elements, in the words
of Eugene Skolnikoff, "not just to determine a regime for the
oceans for the next few years but in laying the basis for the
future organization of an increasingly inter-dependent world."
Malta has attempted to lead the way to a true interna-
tionalism in ocean space. We did this not only because of our
ideals but also because it was clear to us that only in this way
was it possible for us to assure our own interests in the sea
through which we live and breathe. In the fierce clash of
rhetoric and mundane interests at the United Nations we have
consistently sought to dispel suspicions and to encourage for-
ward looking, yet realistic, attitudes while remaining confident
that a clear understanding of the issues, reason, and rational
evaluation of their own long term national interest by all coun-
tries would enable us to reach the goals we set two years ago.
These, we are convinced, will provide expanding opportunities
to all states in their use of the marine environment.
We refuse to believe that states will either entrench them-
selves in an irrational rigidity for the attainment of unrealistic
and perhaps undesirable objectives, or bury their heads in the
sand and refuse to face the inevitable consequence of tech-
nological advance.
We still nourish the hope that the right decisions will be
made in useful time and that the world community will give
itself in ocean space the law and the institutions required by
the progress of science, the impact of global technology and the
pressing needs of man.
32. Stevenson, International Law and the Oceans, 62 DEPT. OF STATE BULL.
339 (1970).
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